A deployment panel, a database and a secrets file, all public
One app on one server, five findings, and the order to fix them in. A sample case that follows our sample report.
This is a sample. It follows our sample report line by line and uses a made-up target, so you can see what a case looks like. It is not a client engagement.
5
findings
1
critical
3 h 42 min
test window
3
fixes due the same day
The target
One web app at example.com, deployed with Dokploy on a single server. Traefik routes the traffic, nginx serves the site, and PostgreSQL runs next to the app.
The pentest ran from the public internet with no credentials, which is the view an attacker starts with. It ran for 3 hours 42 minutes in an isolated sandbox that was destroyed when the run ended.
What the pentest found
| ID | Finding | Severity | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANT-001 | Dokploy panel open to the internet | Critical | example.com:3000 |
| ANT-002 | Environment file readable from the browser | High | https://example.com/.env |
| ANT-003 | PostgreSQL accepts remote connections | High | example.com:5432 |
| ANT-004 | Traefik dashboard has no login | Medium | example.com:8080 |
| ANT-005 | Server header reveals software version | Low | https://example.com/ |
Each finding in the report comes with the request that demonstrates it. For the environment file, that is one line and its answer:
GET /.env HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
DATABASE_URL=postgres://app:[redacted]@db:5432/app
SESSION_SECRET=[redacted]
PAYMENT_API_KEY=[redacted]
Why the findings are worse together
Taken one at a time, two of these look survivable. The database has a password. The environment file is only a text file.
Together they are a direct route to the data. The environment file hands over the database password, and the open port 5432 lets anyone use it from anywhere. No flaw in the application is needed.
The Dokploy panel is the critical one for a different reason. It manages every application, database and domain on the server, so its sign-in page is the single door to all of them, and it was answering to the whole internet. The Traefik dashboard adds a map: every route, service and internal hostname, listed for anyone who asks.
The order to fix them in
Today
- Block public access to the Dokploy panel. Reach it through an SSH tunnel or a VPN instead.
- Move the environment file out of the public folder, then rotate every secret in it. Treat them all as already read.
- Remove the published port from the database container, so the app reaches PostgreSQL over the internal network only.
This week
- Turn off the insecure API mode in Traefik, or put the dashboard behind authentication and an IP allowlist.
Next maintenance window
- Set
server_tokens offin nginx so the version is no longer sent, and review the update schedule.
How each fix is confirmed
A fix counts once the same request that worked for the attacker stops working. The report lists one check per finding:
http://example.com:3000/times out or is refused from outside the server.https://example.com/.envreturns 403 or 404.- A connection to port 5432 from outside the server times out or is refused.
http://example.com:8080/api/http/routersis refused or asks for authentication.- The
Serverheader readsnginx, with no version number.
The One-time plan includes one re-test, which repeats these checks after the fixes are in.
The full report
Every finding above is written up in the sample report, with its evidence, impact, fix and confirmation step.